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Propaganda to Persuade
Tinghua Yu ∗
Abstract
I analyze a model in which an incumbent ruler designs a rule for propaganda dis-
closure that reveals information about her competence to her allies and opponents.
A message that increases beliefs about the incumbent’s competence is considered as
propaganda. I show that for propaganda to be persuasive, it must be limited in fre-
quency. I also demonstrate how various features of the environment affect the frequency
of propaganda. Propaganda increases in frequency as the incumbent’s allies become
more dependent on her and as her opponents become weaker. Further, there is a non-
monotonic relationship between the strength of the conflict of interest between both her
allies and her opponents and the frequency of propaganda. As conflict increases, the
frequency of propaganda decreases up to a threshold beyond which increased conflict
is associated with more frequent propaganda.
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Propaganda is a common feature of autocratic regimes. Empirical studies show that
propaganda has a large effect on the beliefs and behavior of the target population (Adena
et al., 2015; Cantoni et al., 2017; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). Yet a propaganda apparatus does
not just distribute laudatory news about autocratic leaders. State-controlled newspapers in
autocratic regimes have been known to publish unfavorable information. For example, some
state-controlled newspapers in the Soviet Union criticized Gorbachev for the political turmoil
caused by the reform in 1988 (Gibbs, 1999).
How and when is propaganda persuasive? How often does a propaganda apparatus
distribute propaganda as opposed to unfavorable information? To answer these questions, I
develop a model that explains the persuasive effect of propaganda as well as the frequency
of propaganda. In the model, there is an incumbent ruler and two groups – the incumbent’s
ally who shares her policy preference and her opponent who has distinct policy preferences.
Both groups prefer a competent ruler. Groups decide whether to support the incumbent. As
in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), the incumbent can influence decisions of the groups by
designing a rule to reveal information about her competence, which is usually referred to as
information disclosure rule. Given the context, I refer to this rule as propaganda disclosure
rule. A message that increases beliefs about the incumbent’s competence is considered as
propaganda.
In line with the Bayesian persuasion literature, I show that to persuade any group to
support the incumbent, propaganda must be limited in its frequency. More importantly, I
study how various features of the environment affect the frequency of propaganda.1 First, an
increase in the political strength of the incumbent’s opponent’s, defined as the probability
that its decision determines the leadership of the regime, reduces the frequency of propa-
1Conflicts among various kinds of competing groups are used to explain economic and
political outcomes in autocracies (Geddes, 1999; Bueno De Mesquita, 2005; Gandhi, 2008;
Padro´ i Miquel, 2007; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2007).
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ganda. Second, the ally’s dependence on the autocrat increases the frequency of propaganda.
Third, interest conflict among groups has a non-monotonic effect on the frequency of pro-
paganda. As conflict increases, the frequency of propaganda decreases up to a threshold
beyond which increased conflict is associated with increased frequency of propagandaa.
This paper contributes to the research on propaganda. Little (2017) and Huang (2015)
provide a different rationale for propaganda which is not based on its persuasive effect. More
broadly, this paper relates to the literature on information control in autocracies (Egorov
et al., 2009; Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014; Guriev and Treisman, 2015; Lorentzen, 2014; Luo
and Rozenas, 2016; King et al., 2013; Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2015; Hollyer et al., 2015).
Finally, this paper also contributes to the research on persuasive communication in a sym-
metric information setting (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). Recent contributions study
persuasive communication with a single sender and multiple receivers (Alonso and Caˆmara,
2016). A key contribution of this paper is to relate the frequency of messages that favor the
sender to various features of the environment.
The Model
Players There is an incumbent ruler R and two groups in the society. One group is the
incumbent’s ally A and the other is her opponent O. The groups have conflicting interests
over a policy issue. Each has an ideal point zi ∈ R where i ∈ {A,O}. Let d ∈ [0,
√
1/2] be
the difference between zA and zO.
2 d thus measures the strength of the conflict of interest.
A ruler could be competent (θ = 1) or incompetent (θ = 0). Both groups prefer a competent
ruler. Let µ be the belief that a ruler is competent. x ∈ R is denoted as the ruler’s policy
choice. zA is assumed to be the exogenous policy choice of the incumbent ruler. Group i
derives an expected payoff E(ui(x)) = −(x− zi)2 + µ. The incumbent cares only about her
2As I will show later when the belief about the incumbent’s competence is above a thresh-
old, her opponent will support the incumbent. To ensure the threshold is in a unit interval,
I assume that d ∈ [0,√1/2].
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political survival. She makes a payoff of 1 if she stays in power and 0 otherwise.
Selection of the Ruler Groups decide the ruler in society. First, the incumbent’s
ally chooses whether to retain the incumbent (σA = 1) or replace her with a candidate from
its group (σA = 0). zA is assumed to be the exogenous policy choice of the ally’s candidate.
All players share a common belief that the ally’s candidate is competent with probability
1
2
. Afterward, the ruler’s opponent chooses whether to retain the candidate chosen by the
incumbent’s ally ( σO = 1) or replace her with its candidate (σO = 0). zO is assumed to
be the exogenous policy choice of the opponent’s candidate. All players share a common
belief that the opponent’s candidate is competent with probability 1
2
. If the incumbent’s ally
retains her, the probability that the opponent’s decision determines the ruler is 1− ρ where
ρ ∈ [0, 1]; otherwise, the probability is 1 − (1 − e)ρ where e ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, ρ measures the
ally’s political strength and 1−ρ measures the opponent’s political strength. e measures the
degree to which the ally depends on the incumbent.
Propaganda Disclosure Rule The incumbent’s competence θ ∈ {0, 1} is unknown
to all players. Let µ0 be the common prior that the incumbent is competent (θ = 1). Assume
that µ0 < −ed2 + 1
2
. Under this assumption, the groups won’t support the incumbent given
the prior. There might be some turmoil so that the incumbent is not secure. I analyze the
case where this assumption doesn’t hold.
The groups’ beliefs about the incumbent’s competence θ play a key role in their de-
cisions. To stay in power, the incumbent designs a rule to reveal information about her
competence, which is usually referred to as information disclosure rule. Given the context,
I refer to this rule as propaganda disclosure rule. Formally, she chooses pi which consists of
a finite message space S and a family of distributions {pi(·|θ)}θ∈Θ over S. A message that
increases beliefs about the incumbent’s competence is considered as propaganda.
The incumbent commits to her rule for propaganda disclosure. This assumption cap-
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tures the key observation that information gathering and reporting is often delegated to a
bureaucracy. Once the bureaucracy is structured, bureaucrats make decisions about what
information to gather and how to report it. This gives the ruler some commitment power
to truthfully communicate the message produced by the bureaucracy.3 In the appendix, I
build a micro foundation for the commitment assumption and discuss how bureaucracies in
Maoist China and the Soviet Union served as commitment devices.
Timing The timing of the game is as follows. 1. R chooses a propaganda disclosure
rule pi. 2. Nature chooses the value of θ. 3. The message is realized and received by all
players. 4. A makes a decision σA. 5. O makes a decision σO.
Solution Concept The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strate-
gies: given R’s choice of pi and a message realization s ∈ S, A and O form a posterior µs
using Bayes’s rule and take actions σA and σO sequentially.
Analysis
The first result summarizes the decision of the incumbent’s opponent and the second
summarizes her ally’s decision (all proofs are in the appendix).
Lemma 1. The decision of the incumbent’s opponent is as follows.
σO =

0 if σA = 0 or σA = 1 and µs < µO
1 if σA = 1 and µs ≥ µO,
(1)
where µO ≡ d2 + 12 .
The incumbent’s opponent supports the incumbent if the belief about her competence
is strong enough to compensate for the conflict of interest. It always ousts the candidate
3Gehlbach and Keefer (2012); Myerson (2008), and Svolik (2012) examine how institutions
in autocracies alleviate the commitment problem.
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chosen by the incumbent’s ally who shares the same expected competence with its candidate
but represents different interests.
Lemma 2. The decision of the incumbent’s ally is as follows.
σA =

0 if µs < µA
1 otherwise,
(2)
where µA ≡ −ed2 + 12 .
The incumbent’s ally supports the incumbent if the belief about her competence is
above a threshold. As the conflict of interest between the two groups increases and as the
incumbent’s ally becomes more dependent on her, her ally requires a weaker belief about
her competence to support her. Replacing the incumbent increases the chance that the
incumbent’s opponent’s candidate takes over. If the incumbent’s opponent’s candidate takes
over, her ally incurs a policy loss. Supporting the incumbent could avoid such loss. As the
conflict of interest increases, this loss increases. When the incumbent’s ally becomes more
dependent on her, the increase in the chance that the opponent’s candidate takes over caused
by the replacement of the incumbent is greater. As a result, the incumbent’s ally needs a
weaker belief about her competence to support her.
Consider the incumbent’s design of a propaganda disclosure rule. First, I show that
the incumbent either distributes propaganda to persuade her ally or propaganda to persuade
her opponent. I then show that the frequency of propaganda that would be chosen has to be
limited. Finally, I derive the optimal propaganda disclosure rule and examine how exogenous
features of the environment affect the frequency of propaganda.
The incumbent designs the propaganda disclosure rule to affect the groups’ decisions.
If the incumbent loses the support of her ally, she loses the support of her opponent. There-
6
fore, in terms of the groups’ decisions, there are three possibilities: Both groups withdraw
support, only the incumbent’s ally supports her, or both groups support the incumbent. The
incumbent will construct a propaganda disclosure rule pi with three messages — each leads
to one outcome among the three possibilities. A message s− leads to no support from both
groups. A message s+ persuades the ally and hence political survival with probability ρ. A
message s++ persuades both groups and thus political survival with certainty. The groups
are Bayesian. s− must induce a posterior of 0; otherwise, the incumbent would benefit from
further disclosing information. By the same token, s+ must induce a posterior of µA and
s++ a posterior of µO. Therefore, s
+ and s++ are the possible propaganda that she would
distribute in equilibrium.
The incumbent chooses the frequency of s+, denoted by αA and the frequency of s
++,
denoted by αO. The groups update their beliefs about the incumbent’s competence such that
the expectation of the posteriors must equal the prior. This constrains the frequency of s+
and the frequency of s++. In other words, to persuade any group to support the incumbent,
favorable news must be limited in its frequency. Formally, αA × µA + αO × µO = µ0.
The incumbent’s problem of propaganda disclosure is equivalent to the optimization
problem as follows.
max
αA,αO
V (pi) = αAρ+ αO, s.t.αA × µA + αO × µO = µ0.
Propaganda s++ ensures that the incumbent stays in power for certain while propa-
ganda s+ leads to probabilistic political survival. Moreover, s++ induces a higher posterior.
If she sends one additional s++, she has to decrease the frequency of s+ by µO
µA
which is
greater than one. Therefore, the incumbent faces trade-off between the frequency of pro-
paganda and the frequency of political survival upon the arrival of propaganda. When the
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increased frequency of subsequent political survival by sending s++ is lower or equal to the
reduced frequency of propaganda (i.e. 1
ρ
≤ µO
µA
), the incumbent distributes s+ as propa-
ganda. Otherwise, the incumbent distributes s++ as propaganda. The following proposition
summarizes optimal rule for propaganda disclosure.
Proposition 1. If 1
ρ
≤ µO
µA
, the optimal rule for propaganda disclosure pi+1 has support on
{s−, s+}, where given realization s−, σA = 0 and σO = 0 and given realization s+, σA = 1
and σO = 0. Let pi
+
θ ≡ Pr[s+|θ], then
pi+θ =

1 if θ = 1
µ0
1−µ0
1−µA
µA
if θ = 0.
(3)
If 1
ρ
> µO
µA
, the optimal rule for propaganda disclosure pi++1 has support on {s−, s++}, where
given realization s−, σA = 0 and σO = 0 and given realization s++, σA = 1 and σO = 1. Let
pi++θ ≡ Pr[s++|θ], then
pi++θ =

1 if θ = 1
µ0
1−µ0
1−µO
µO
if θ = 0.
(4)
µA = −ed2 + 12 and µO = d2 + 12 .
When the incumbent’s ally’s dependence on her is strong, the ally requires a weak
belief to support her. The incumbent thus could distribute s+ at a high frequency. When
the degree of the conflict of interest between the groups is large, the difference in the strength
of the beliefs required by two groups to support the incumbent is large. The frequency of
propaganda when she sends s+ could be much higher than that of propaganda when she
sends s++. When the opponent is weak, the likelihood of political survival upon the arrival
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of s+ is high. Under the above conditions, the incumbent distributes propaganda to persuade
only her ally. Otherwise, the incumbent uses propaganda to persuade both groups.
In the equilibrium, the incumbent sends either s+ or s++ as propaganda. I summarize
the frequency of propaganda as follows.
Proposition 2. The frequency of propaganda is µ
0
µA
if 1
ρ
≤ µO
µA
and µ
0
µO
otherwise, where
µA ≡ −ed2 + 12 and µO ≡ d2 + 12 .
Figure 1 shows the comparative statics of propaganda. Panel A illustrates that when
the incumbent’s opponent is weak, she distributes propaganda more often. When her op-
ponent is weak, the incumbent expects to stay in power with a high probability with only
the support from her ally. As a result, she uses propaganda to persuade only her ally, which
implies more frequent propaganda. Panel B shows that when ally’s dependence on her is
strong, propaganda is more frequent. When ally’s dependence on her is strong, it requires
a weak belief about her competence to support her. She thus uses propaganda to persuade
only the ally. As ally’s dependence on her increases, she distributes propaganda more fre-
quently. Panel C demonstrates the effect of conflict of interest on propaganda. When the
conflict is below a threshold, the opponent requires a slightly stronger belief than the ally to
support her. As the conflict increases, her opponent needs a much stronger belief than her
ally. To persuade her opponent, she has to distribute propaganda less often. Eventually, the
incumbent finds it no longer optimal to persuade her opponent when the conflict is above
a threshold. She thus uses propaganda only to persuade her ally. As the conflict increases,
the frequency of such propaganda increases.
Conclusion
This paper aims to understand how propaganda is persuasive and why the frequency of
favorable news is limited. It shows that to persuade any group to support an incumbent, pro-
paganda must be limited in its frequency. It also shows that the frequency of propaganda is
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Figure 1: Comparative Statistics of Propaganda
affected by various features of the environment, including the dependence of the incumbent’s
allies on the incumbent, the power of her opponents and the conflict of interest between the
allies and the opponents. These ideas are most relevant in institutionalized autocracies where
autocrats can commit to limiting propaganda. In democracies, incumbents can also commit
to limiting propaganda. Yet, unlike citizens in the model, voters in a democracy have access
to information other than what is tightly controlled by the government. They might not
necessarily consume information distributed by the government.4 In future work, it would
be interesting to develop a model of propaganda where citizens can decide whether to listen
to the government’s message.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof. Lemma 1. The expected competence of the incumbent autocrat is µs, which is µs−1/2
greater than the expected competence of politician from its group. The difference between
the incumbent’s ideology and her opponent’s ideology is d. Based on the trade-off between
competence and ideology, the opponent retains the incumbent if the posterior belief about
her competence µs is above a threshold µO ≡ d2 + 12 .
Proof. Lemma 2. If µs ≥ µO, the opposition keeps the incumbent if the incumbent is kept
by the ally. Expecting this, the ally always supports the incumbent.
If µs < µO, her opponent will place its own candidate. The ally expects to make a
payoff of E(u0A) ≡ 12 + (1− (1− e)ρ)(−d2) from replacing the incumbent and a expect payoff
of E(u1A) ≡ ρµs+(1−ρ)12 +(1−ρ)(−d2) from keeping the incumbent. If µs ≥ µR ≡ −ed2 + 12 ,
E(u1A) ≥ E(u0A), and the ally thus supports the incumbent.
Proof. Proposition 1. When group i holds some belief µ, it takes action σi according to their
optimal decision derived in equation (1) and (2) and the incumbent makes an expected payoff,
denoted by vˆ(µ), accordingly. An rule for propaganda disclosure pi induces a distribution
of posterior beliefs, denoted by τ(µ). The incumbent’s payoff from any rule for propaganda
disclosure is thus the expectation of vˆ under τ . Because the groups update beliefs following a
bayesian rule, the expected posterior belief must equal the prior. The incumbent’s problem
is thus equivalent to choosing τ(µ) to solve the following optimization problem.
max
τ
Eτ vˆ(µ)
s.t.
∑
Supp(τ)
µdτ(µ) = µ0
To solve the above problem, first, we derive vˆ(µ), i.e. the expected payoff for the
incumbent given some belief µ. When µ < µA, the ally replaces the incumbent and so does
the opposition. The incumbent is ousted for certain. When µ ∈ [µA, µO), the ally keeps
the incumbent and the opposition ousts the incumbent. When µ ≥ µO, the ally keeps the
incumbent and so does the opponent. The incumbent stays in the office with certainty. In
summary, we have
vˆ(µ) =

0 if µ < µA
ρ if µ ∈ [µA, µO)
1 if µ ≥ µO
(5)
where µA ≡ −ed2 + 12 and µO ≡ d2 + 12 .
I follow the concave-closure approach developed by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to
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solve the optimization problem. Let V be the concave closure of vˆ:
V (µ) ≡ sup{z|(µ, z) ∈ co(vˆ)}
where co(vˆ) denotes the convex hull of the graph of v.
V (µ) is the largest payoff the incumbent can achieve with any rule for propaganda
disclosure when the prior is µ. If (µ,, z) ∈ co(vˆ), then there exists a distribution of posteriors
τ such that Eτµ = µ
′
and Eτ vˆ(µ) = z. Thus, co(vˆ) is the set of (µ, z) such that if the prior
is µ, there exists a rule for propaganda disclosure with value z. Hence, V (µ) is the largest
payoff she can achieve with any signal when the prior is µ. The concave-closure approach
shows that there are two formats of optimal rule for propaganda disclosure. When a certain
condition is satisfied, the incumbent ruler chooses one as opposed to the other.
Figure 2 shows the function vˆ, the concave closure V , and the optimal rule for propa-
ganda disclosure when 1
ρ
≤ µO
µA
. µ denotes the probability that θ = 1. vˆ is a step function:
the incumbent’s expected payoff is 0 whenever µ < µA, ρ whenever µA ≤ µ < µO, and 1
whenever µ ≥ µO. As panel C in Figure 2 shows, the signal induces two posterior values:
µl = 0 and µh = µA.
Let the probability that the realized signal induces belief of µR be α. Because the
distribution τ is Bayes plausible, we must have
(1− α)× 0 + α× µA = µ0.
This implies that α = µ
0
µA
. Hence, the optimal τ is that with probability α = µ
0
µA
the posterior
belief is µA and with probability 1−α = 1− µ0µA the posterior belief is 0. Now, we compute the
signal that induces the optimal τ . Denote the optimal rule for propaganda disclosure with
a realization space {s−, s+} by pi∗. If the realization is s−, the ally replaces the incumbent,
σA = 0. If the realization is s
+, the ally retains the incumbent, σA = 1, while the opponent
replaces the incumbent, σO = 0. Let pi
+
θ = Pr[s
+|θ], i.e. the probability that the realized
signal is s+given the state of the world θ and pi−θ = Pr[s
−|θ], i.e. the probability that the
realized signal is s−given the state of the world θ. We have
pi+θ =
{
1 if θ = 1
µ0
1−µ0
1−µA
µA
if θ = 0
(6)
and pi−θ = 1− pi+θ .
Similarly, we could derive the optimal rule for propaganda disclosure in panel C Figure
3. Notice that when ρ
µA
= 1
µO
. R is indifferent to the following rule for propaganda disclo-
sures. The rule for propaganda disclosure induces posteriors which are 0, µA, and µO. The
probability combination (1 − αA − αO, αA, αO) over the above posterior combination must
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Figure 2: Design of Optimal Propaganda Disclosure 1
ρ
≤ µO
µA
Figure 3: Design of Optimal Propaganda Disclosure 1
ρ
> µO
µA
satisfy the following Bayesian plausible requirement
(1− αA − αO)× 0 + αA × µA + αO × µO = µ0
where αA ∈ [0, 1] and αO ∈ [0, 1]. To simplify the discussion without loss of generality,
I assume that among all the indifferent rules for propaganda disclosures, the incumbent
chooses the one which assigns 0 probability to the posterior αO. Denote the optimal rule for
propaganda disclosure with a realization space {s−, s++} by pi∗∗ . If the signal realization
is s−, the ally replaces the incumbent, σA = 0. If the signal realization is s++, the ally
retains the incumbent, σA = 1, and the opponent retains the incumbent, σO = 1. Let
pi++θ = Pr[s
++|θ] and pi−θ = Pr[s−|θ]. We have
pi++θ =
{
1 if θ = 1
µ0
1−µ0
1−µO
µO
if θ = 0
(7)
and pi−θ = 1− pi++θ .
Appendix B: Commitment
The incumbent commits to a rule for propaganda disclosure by designing bureaucracies
that gather and distribute information. First, I build a selection model as a micro foundation
for the commitment assumption in the main model. Then I discuss how autocratic leaders
in Maoist China and the Soviet Union designed bureaucracies to implement the rule for
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propaganda disclosure.
Micro Foundation
Consider that the incumbent wants to commit to a rule for propaganda disclosure
such that with probability q that her incompetence will be communicated as propaganda.
To implement such rule for propaganda disclosure, the autocrat could staff the bureaucracy
such that 1−q proportion of the bureaucrats are honest and the rest q proportion corrupted.
Both honest and corrupted bureaucrats generate propaganda when the competence is high.
When the competence is low, an honest bureaucrat generates an unfavorable message while
a corrupted bureaucrat generates propaganda. A random bureaucrat is picked and his/her
message is the message distributed by the bureaucracy.
The Maoist China Case
In the late 1950s, Mao, the then leadership of the Chinese government, adopted the
Great Leap Forward policy. This policy caused one of the greatest famines in human history.
However, when the famine was spreading over the country, reports that demonstrate the
effectiveness of the Great Leap Forward Policy were abundant. Mao didn’t not directly
engaging in gathering and reporting information about the outcome of the Great leap forward
policy. Instead, Mao delegated to the statistical report system and the local governments.
By implementing structure features in the statistical report system and local governments,
Mao shaped the rule for propaganda disclosure. Mao advocated that politics should take
command over the statistical report system. Data collected by party cadres assisted by the
masses were supposed to be more accurate than the bureaucrats in the statistical system.
The result was a gross exaggeration of production figures in 1958 and the breakdown of
the statistical reporting for several years(Banister, 1991). Besides, Mao waged political
campaigns to cultivate low-level officials’ radical ideology and to shape their career incentives
accordingly. Motivated by radical ideology and career incentives, lower-level officials tended
to over-report grain production (Kung and Chen, 2011).
The Soviet Union Case5
The communist party in the Soviet Union exercised control over the media through
its propaganda department. The propaganda department decided the appointment of the
chief editors in news agencies. The chief editor was the key decision-maker in the editorial
board which exercised the daily decision over what information to gather and how to report
it. Chief editors who were loyal to the communist party used their newspaper as a platform
for communist propaganda. Influenced by professionalism, some chief editors made decisions
according to true journalism. By choosing the composition of chief editors, the party affects
the rule for propaganda disclosure.
5See McNair (2006), for example, for studies on Soviet media.
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Appendix C: Results if µ0 > −ed2 + 12.
If the prior µ0 > d2 +1/2, both groups support the incumbent. The incumbent babbles
in equilibrium. If the prior −ed2 + 1/2 < µ0 ≤ d2 + 1/2, the incumbent chooses between
the following rules for propaganda disclosure. The incumbent could babble which leads to
the support from her ally. With babbling, the incumbent stays in the office with probability
ρ. The incumbent could also use propaganda to persuade the opponent. With such rule for
propaganda disclosure, the incumbent stays in the office with probability µ
0
µO
. If ρ > µ
0
µO
,
the incumbent babbles; otherwise, the incumbent designs a rule for propaganda disclosure
to persuade the opposition. I summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If ρ > µ
0
µO
or µ0 > d2 + 1/2, the optimal rule for propaganda disclosure
is babbling. If ρ ≤ µ0
µO
and −ed2 + 1/2 < µ0 ≤ d2 + 1/2, the optimal rule for propaganda
disclosure pi++1 has support on {s−, s++}, where given realization s−, σR = 0 and σO = 0
and given realization s++, σR = 1 and σO = 1. Let pi
++
θ ≡ Pr[s++|θ], then
pi++θ =
{
1 if θ = 1
µ0
1−µ0
1−µO
µO
if θ = 0.
(8)
µO = d
2 + 1
2
.
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